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Over 94 million Americans live in coastal counties.1   Despite the coast’s scenic views and 
salty charm, more and more people are fleeing the coast as the sea engulfs their property and the 
cost of maintaining their ocean-view homes becomes too high.2  Those who can afford to escape 
rising sea levels and the accompanying floods flock to high ground, pushing out those who can no 
longer afford to stay.  This is known as “climate gentrification,” where those escaping the sea are 
gentrifying areas inland and causing displacement of long-term residents, usually minorities or 
members of impoverished communities.3   
 This note will discuss three types of policies commonly implemented to combat climate 
change and rising sea levels – protection, accommodation, and retreat policies – and will explore 
how they contribute to climate gentrification.  It will offer solutions to balance the influx of people 
inland.  The concept of climate gentrification has been studied in Miami and the surrounding area.4  
This note, however, will focus on climate gentrification as a national phenomenon, and use general 
policy proposals to portray how those policies effect this concept.   
Part II of this note gives a brief history of climate change and sea level rise, introduces 
climate gentrification, and how the two are related; it also introduces the governmental policies 
and regulations applied to combat climate change.  Part III explores the three types of climate 
change mitigation policies, how well they work to protect property owners on the sea, and how 
 
1 60 Million Live in the Path of Hurricanes, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/coastal-county-population-rises.html (last visited April 5, 2019). 
2 Jesse Keenan et al., Climate gentrification: from theory to empiricism in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 2018 
ENVIRON. RES. LETT. 13 054001, 1. 
3 Id.  
4 Id.   
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those policies could affect gentrification.  Part IV proposes a solution that keeps the interests of 
both the coastal property owners and mainland dwellers in mind.  This note only aims to introduce 
the legal implications of the recently-introduced idea of “climate gentrification,” how to best 
combat those effects to prevent displacement, and how property owners on both the coasts and dry 
land can take note of what can happen in the near future as the law adapts to climate change.   




Hurricane Michael in 2018, equipped with “unprecedented strength,” took 16 lives, 
destroyed hundreds of homes, erased utilities for weeks, and brought with it a toxic algae bloom 
in the Florida Panhandle.5  Michael was the first Category 4 hurricane to hit the Panhandle region, 
one of only four hurricanes to hit the Panhandle in the last 50 years, and the strongest hurricane to 
hit the continental U.S. in over 20 years.6  Hurricane Harvey in 2017 was nearly as destructive, if 
not more than Michael, accompanied by orders of evacuation and a path of destruction still being 
repaired to this day.7  Hurricanes Sandy in 2012, notorious Katrina in 2005, and Irma in 2017 also 
share the honor as some of the deadliest and costliest hurricanes to hit the United States.8  While 
 
5 Michael’s Death Toll Jumps as Crews Search for Survivors, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/hurricane-michael-damage-florida-flooding-georgia-power-outage-weather-
deaths-today-live-updates/ 
6 Brandon Miller, Michael is the Strongest Hurricane to Hit the Continental US Since Andrew, CNN, (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/weather/hurricane-michael-stats-superlatives-wxc-trnd/index.html 
7 2017 Hurricane Harvey: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD VISION, https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-
relief-news-stories/hurricane-harvey-facts 




shocking and disturbing, these superstorms are becoming more of an expected pattern each year.9  
Climate change researchers are watching the potential for hurricane numbers, duration, and 
strength rise.10  Sea surface temperature, a power source for hurricanes, is rising each year and it 
has been suggested that the increase in this temperature is likely correlated with the rising 
destructive superstorm activity.11 
Scientists attribute these monster hurricanes to the worsening effects of a rising global 
temperature.12  Hurricane Michael’s dump of a toxic algae bloom deposited a dangerous red tide 
phenomena which is occurring more frequently each year.13  Toxic algae kills massive amounts of 
marine life and causes respiratory illnesses in humans.14  Flooding is also a cause for concern, 
where storm-surges often threaten life and property as a result of additional water being pulled 
onto the mainland.15  Flooding events are turning more catastrophic; by 2080, 100-year flood 
events are expected to change to 30-year flood events, and it has even been suggested this turn 
may come before 2080.16  Flooding from Hurricane Sandy reached levels that occur roughly every 
1000 years, but by the end of this century could occur every 20.17 
Perhaps the most concerning effect, at least for purposes of this note, is the rising sea level.  
The sea level has risen about seven inches over the past century due to ocean expansion from 
 
9 Wei Cui and Luca Caracoglia, Exploring hurricane wind speed along US Atlantic coast in warming climate and 
effects on predictions of structural damage and intervention costs, ENGINEERING STRUCTURES Volume 122, 209 
(2016). 
10 Id.   
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 248.   
13 Gustaff Hallegraeff, Ocean Climate Change, Phytoplankton Community Responses, and Harmful Algal Blooms: A 
Formidable Predictive Challenge, JOURNAL OF PHYCOLOGY. 46, 220–235 
14 Michael’s death toll jumps, supra note 7.  
15 Claire Weisz, Alan F. Blumberg, Jesse M. Keenan, Design Meets Science in a Changing Climate: A Case for 
Regional Thinking to Address Urban Coastal Resilience, SOCIAL RESEARCH VOL. 82 (Fall 2015).   
16 Id.    
17 Michael Oppenheimer, Adapting to Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels, Limiting Risks SOCIAL RESEARCH VOL 82, 
No.3 (Fall 2015). 
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warmer temperatures, glacier melt, and ice sheet melt.18  Three of the nine highest recorded water 
levels in the NY Harbor region have occurred since 2010 and eight of the largest twenty have 
occurred since 1990.19  As the sea level rises, coastal storms will push the sea to levels and areas 
it has rarely or never been in human memory, creating record high flood levels more and more 
frequently along the coast.20  The rising sea level not only floods its surroundings: it erodes 
shorelines and displaces entire coastal communities.21  This leaves vulnerable the 94 million 
people who reside in coastal property in the U.S.22   
 
CLIMATE GENTRIFICATION 
Jesse Keenan, a Harvard scholar who studies residential patterns in Miami and other coastal 
regions predicts that climate change will greatly influence the residential market in areas of high 
elevation.23  He has coined the term “Climate Gentrification” to denote middle-to-upper-income 
residents leaving Miami Beach and other like-places with nuisance flooding for higher elevation, 
which in turn raises the price of property in those areas.24  
 Based on his study, there are two ways in which people can be displaced around the coastal 
regions.25  First, as population moves from coastal areas to inland urban areas, those without means 
can be displaced from the urban areas because the property becomes unaffordable by virtue of its 
resiliency.26  Keenan found the rate of appreciation of a single-family property in Miami Dade 
 
18 Id.  
19 Weisz, supra note 15.  
20 Oppenheimer, supra note 17.    
21 Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change 
Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 521, 522 (2010). 
22 S. Jeffress Williams, Sea Level Rise Implications for Coastal Regions, JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH: SPECIAL 
ISSUE 63, 190 (2013).  
23 Keenan, supra note 2, at 2. 
24 Keenan, supra note 2 ,at 1. 
25 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
26 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
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County to be positively related to and correlated with incremental measures of higher elevation, 
thus hypothesizing that the cost of living will drastically rise as households will gradually move 
from the coastal barrier islands to the mainland.27    
The second hypothesizes that as it becomes increasingly expensive to maintain coastal 
property, those without means living along the coast will be displaced because it becomes 
unaffordable to keep up with repairs and insurance.28  He states that the deterioration of 
environmental conditions will cause a shift in the overall cost of living, which will only be feasibly 
borne by wealthier and wealthier households as time goes on.29  Gentrification, in this example he 
says, would occur inversely by the fact that vulnerable populations are unable to afford to live 
along the coast due to the property taxes, insurance, repairs, to even the loss of productivity due to 
sitting in traffic in water-logged streets.30     
Since the 1960s, policymakers began to seriously consider an appropriate response to 
climate change.31  These plans have focused on safety, the neighborhoods, buildings, structures, 
and most importantly, the residents.32  In 2008, federal and state officials urged Congress that the 
threat to coastal regions was irreversible and states should receive assistance from the federal 
government to facilitate proper solutions to cope with rising sea levels.33  Generally speaking, there 
are three policy responses that local governments enact to minimize the hazards of climate 
change.34  The policy solutions are to accommodate climate change threats through insurance or 
 
27 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
28 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
29 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
30 Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
31 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 USCS § 7401 (first enacted in 1955 and continuously revised since). 
32 Id.  
33 Devon Applegate, The Intersection of the Takings Clause and Rising Sea Levels: Justice O’Connor’s 
Concurrence in Palazzolo Could Prevent Climate Change Chaos, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 512 (2016).  
34Symposium, Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use Controls: Land Use and Climate Change: 
Lawyers Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 521, 526 (2013).   
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building codes, to protect property with physical barriers, or to retreat from the coast.35  Keenan’s 
conclusion is that land use regulators will be tasked with evaluating the consequences of relocation 
and densification, particularly in higher-elevations.36  He theorizes that to mitigate the influx in 
population and the accompanying chance of gentrification, municipalities should begin an inquiry 
into inclusionary zoning, the creation of affordable housing by governmental mandate.37   
 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES 
Accommodation policies attempt to minimize the damage to buildings from flooding, 
storm surges, and hurricanes.38  These policies aim to decrease the damage to structures caused by 
flooding and storms through costly insurance policies, minimum floor elevations on newly 
constructed buildings, structural bracing, or building codes that comport with flood insurance 
policies.39  These policies do exactly as their name suggests, allowing for continuous climate 
change abuse without trying to prevent the damage or mitigate the future risk.   Protection policies 
defend property against the threat of sea level rise, storm surges, and floods usually through sturdy 
structures like levees or barriers like dunes.40   Retreat policies aim to minimize the hazards of sea 
level rise by prohibiting or removing development from areas vulnerable to flooding.41   These 
policies will be analyzed in conjunction with Keenan’s proposed solution of inclusionary zoning 
to understand the implication they may pose on the law.  Because private property is affected in 
 
35 Id. See also Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 390, 404 (2014); Alica Kaswan, Climate Change Adaptation And Land Use: Exploring The Federal Role, 
47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 509, 513 (2013); Jesse Reiblich, Enabling And Limiting Conditions Of Coastal Adaptation: 
Local Governments, Land Uses, And Legal Challenges, 22 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 156, 167 (2017).   
36 Keenan, supra note 2, at 7. 
37 Keenan, supra note 2, at 7. 
38 Symposium, supra note 34, at 526. 
39 Symposium, supra note 34, at 526. 
40 Symposium, supra note 34, at 526.  
41 Symposium, supra note 34, at 526. 
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each of these types of policies, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will be implicated and 
possibly act as an impediment to the success of these policies.42  Furthermore, because of the 
complexity of these policies and the legal challenges they convey, lawmakers may end up wasting 
time on the hurdles they present rather than finding solutions for those on the mainland who are at 
risk of displacement.  
PART III 
ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
TAKINGS CHALLENGES 
Local governments and the federal government can regulate private property, through 
traditional police power, for “public use,” which the courts have interpreted to mean promoting 
public health, safety, welfare, or morals.43  Sometimes a regulation destroys value in a way deemed 
to be a taking.44  Other times, takings can occur directly through the power of eminent domain.  In 
addition to this “public use” requirement, the government’s power to take private property is also 
limited by the Fifth Amendment’s “just compensation” requirement.45  Compensation is 
determined by the judiciary, ensuring that the property owner would be put in the same position 
monetarily as he would be if his property had not been taken.46  The Supreme Court has frequently 
held that the market value of property at the time of the taking is the best measure for 
compensation.47 
Land use regulations put in place to protect landowners from climate change will inevitably 
restrict private property development and will be subject to takings challenges.48  Governments 
 
42 Applegate, supra note 33, at 512.   
43 See Kelo v. City of New London, 268 Conn. 1, 35 (2004).  
44 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 (1992). 
45  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
46 See, infra notes 75-85. 
47 See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
48 See Appelgate, supra, note 33; (a “regulatory taking,” See infra notes 87 – 118).   
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will also have to build barriers on private property, by taking an easement through eminent domain, 
also subjecting these acts to takings challenges.49  However, Takings Clause jurisprudence “lacks 
both uniformity and clarity,” and judges will have to answer to landowners’ takings challenges as 
a result of climate change policies, ultimately becoming “chaotic.”50  
 
INCLUSIONARY ZONING 
 Kennan’s solution, inclusionary zoning, refers to a scheme that “requires developers to 
mitigate the adverse effects of non-residential development upon the shortage of housing either 
indirectly, by contributing to an affordable-housing trust fund, or directly, by actually constructing 
affordable housing.”51   For example, the ordinance at issue in Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Holmdel 
allowed the developer to either build below density requirements or to contribute to a trust fund 
for a percentage of the purchase price of the new units.52  The trust fund was used for the direct 
benefit to the production of lower income units in a given project.53  Other examples of ordinances 
typically allow the developer to allot a percentage of new units for lower income families or 
contribute to a similar trust fund.54   
 The developers in Holmdel challenged the inclusionary ordinance, claiming the ordinance 
was an unconstitutional grant of statutory power and that it constituted a taking of property.55  The 
Holdmel Court in previous years had decided S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Mt. 
Laurel II), which had imposed an affirmative obligation on every municipality in New Jersey to 
 
49 Infra notes 75-85.   
50 Applegate, supra, note 33 at 512.   
51 Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 564 (1990).   
52 Id. at 559-61.  
53 Id.   
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 555.   
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provide affordable housing.56  In Holmdel, the court held that the inclusionary ordinance at issue 
served the purpose of providing affordable housing within a region and bore a real and substantial 
relationship to the regulation of land use, thereby following the Mt. Laurel II decision.57  The court 
held there was no unconstitutional grant of statutory power because through the Mt. Laurel II 
decision and New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, each municipality had the power to enact ordinances 
to further affordable housing goals.58  “The fact that defendants seek to accomplish the general-
welfare goal of affordable housing by development fees rather than by mandatory set-asides does 
not negate a ‘real and substantial relationship’ of such development fees to the regulation of 
land.”59  As for the takings claim, the court held that as long as the ordinances were “not 
confiscatory and [did] not result in an inadequate return of investment,” there was no injury.60 
Inclusionary zoning in theory then, takes into account the finite supply of land and ensures 
the opportunity and means to provide affordable housing.61  Inclusionary zoning has not proven to 
be as effective in practice, however.   The Florida Legislature enacted the Growth Management 
Act (GMA), which required municipalities to take housing supply and affordability into account.62  
Despite its intentions, the authors of the GMA admit it has resulted in more “aspirational goal-
setting as opposed to realistic planning.”63  The goals, policies, and objectives have gone 
unrealized and have not been fully implemented due to a community that expresses a desire for 
affordable housing, establishes a comprehensive plan to achieve the goal, but then promulgates 
 
56 92 N.J. 158, 219 (1983). 
57 Holmdel, 121 N.J. at 573. 
58 Id. at 582. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.   
61 See Id; See also Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1; Tocco v. New Jersey Council on Affordable 
Hous., 242 N.J.Super. 218, 221 (1990). 
62 J. Michael Marshall and Mark A. Rothenberg, An Analysis of Affordable Work Force Housing Initiatives and 
Their Legality in the State of Floriday, Part I, Vol. 82, No. 6, https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/an-
analysis-of-affordable-work-force-housing-initiatives-and-their-legality-in-the-state-of-florida-part-i/  
63 Id.  
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development regulations that cap permissible development at a density far less than the density 
required to achieve the plan’s goals.64 
Furthermore, inclusionary zoning has been criticized for imposing “significant burdens on 
those who wish to develop their property.”65  Governments vying to build new housing for low-
income families do so assuming that housing needs must primarily be met with new housing.66  
However, most low-to-moderate-income housing has always been provided through “filtering,” a 
process by which the wealthy move into brand new homes, the moderate-income population take 
up older homes, and the low-income population rent or own outdated housing.67  Revenues raised 
from taxing new construction could instead be spent by an inclusionary government program to 
assist low-income families in purchasing existing housing units.68   
 All of this to say that perhaps Keenan’s suggestion of implementing more inclusionary 
zoning policies is not the best solution to limit displacement caused by climate gentrification.  As 
discussed below, each policy proposed to assist in climate change mitigation also presents its own 
legal challenges.69  The best solution then, is to tie the inclusionary zoning into the climate change 
policies to introduce a new idea of transferable development rights (TDRs), which will be 





64 Id.  (No Florida statutes could be found nor case law discussing the success or failure or legality of inclusionary 
ordinances in Florida).   
65 Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188, 194 (2001).   
66 Ellickson, Robert C., The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1185 (1981). 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Infra, notes 70 – 146.   




Protection policies focus on defending individual buildings and sites from flooding and 
shore erosion in order to combat climate change effects.71  These include building dunes, levees, 
floodwalls, tidal barriers or barrier islands.72  Local governments, and the federal government even, 
can take an easement from private property through eminent domain in order to build protectionist 
measures, discussed here.73  The government may also take the entirety of a private property 
through eminent domain, discussed below as a form of retreat.74 
Determining “just compensation” for eminent domain purposes for a coastal property is 
confusing and presents an obstacle to effectively implementing protection policies.  Consider a 
protective dune or wall on someone’s private property built by the government to save the property.  
How much economic value and practical use did the government usurp by stripping a family of 30 
feet of beach access, or 22 feet of beach visibility?  Was it possible the government added value 
to the home by doing so, considering this protective dune will add at least 50 years of life to the 
property?   
This issue of just compensation arose in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.75  The 
Borough condemned a portion of the Karan’s property to replace an existing smaller dune with a 
larger dune.76  The new dune was part of a larger shore-protection project designed to protect all 
residents of the Borough from “the destructive fury of the ocean,” but it resulted in the Karans 
losing part of their view of the beach.77  The Karans were entitled to just compensation under the 
 
71 Applegate, supra note 33, at 515.   
72 Id.  
73 Joshua Ulan Galperin, Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Horne's Compensation Analysis with an Eye to 
Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 9 (2016).  
74 See infra, notes 121-129.   
75 214 N.J. 384 (2013). 
76 Id. at 392. 
77 Id.  
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New Jersey and United States Constitutions, but the question was how to properly calculate a 
compensation when the Karans’ property value was both lessened and enhanced by the dune.78  
Just compensation should be based on benefits that are “capable of reasonable calculation 
at the time of the taking.”79  Speculative benefits should not be considered in a just compensation 
analysis.80  Benefits that both sellers and buyers agree enhance the value of the property, however, 
should be considered in the determination.81  The court failed to define both of these terms.82  The 
Borough argued that the Karans newfound longevity and ability to stay on their property greatly 
increased the value of the home, while adding that the Karans’ tax contribution was infinitesimal 
– and the court agreed and remanded the case for the jury to determine what the value of the 
protection was.83  The court declared the fair market value of the property to be the standard in just 
compensation cases, but this value is ultimately a question for the jury to determine.84  
Subsequently, the Karans and the Borough settled for $1.85   
This uncertainty in value could disadvantage littoral property owners because their 
expectations for the price of their property would be determined by finicky jury members.  The 
before and after market approach likely results in little compensation, just like in Harvey Cedars, 
as the government will argue the 30 years of protection from the dune, albeit a taking, is priceless.  
It is likely there will be an influx of compensation challenges in the near future if governments 
 
78 Id. at 388.   
79 Id. at 412-13. 
80 Id. at 413. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Harvey Cedars, 214 N.J. at 415-416 
84 Id. at 417.  “We can only ensure that every person will receive just compensation, as promised by our State and 
Federal Constitutions. Using fair market value as the benchmark is the best method to achieve that result.”   
85 Brittany Harrison, The Compensation Conundrum In Partial Takings Cases And The Consequences Of Borough 




turn to protectionist measures and take from private property in order to do the protecting.86  
However, these protectionist policies are only delaying the inevitable, because eventually the water 
will become impossible to hold back.  Littoral property owners will eventually have to move from 
their coastal homes, leaving the problem of displacement to repeat itself.    
 
RETREAT POLICIES 
Retreating policies attempt to reduce the hazards created by sea level rise by restricting, 
prohibiting, or removing development and housing altogether from areas at risk of being destroyed 
by flooding.87  These policies force populations out of their homes through either the acquisition 
of the entire property by eminent domain, or by prohibiting land development with land use 
regulations.88  Retreating is generally deemed impossible by local governments because it is 
“politically unpopular and expensive,” especially when done through the purchase of already 
developed properties by eminent domain.89  Although unpopular, retreating has slowly crept into 
city planning in urban and rural areas through zoning ordinances, and these ordinances are 
considered the more proactive approach of climate change policies that prevent flood disasters.90 
While some people retreat without government intervention due to high costs of 
maintaining their coastal property, or become disillusioned by competing with the sea, most retreat 
 
86 See infra, pp. 22-23.   
87 Applegate, supra note 33, at 515.   
88 Land use regulation is controlled primarily through zoning ordinances to control and direct the development of 
property.  Zoning controls the height, use, bulk, and density of buildings.  Use zones typically control if the building 
will be used for industry, residence, or other purposes.  Height zones control limits and maximums for airspace and 
stories of a building.  Bulk controls the lot’s size, normally the lot’s percentage of occupation.  Density establishes 
population limits on the lot, by controlling how many people can occupy the space based on square feet.  Cities 
should deny zoning ordinances which request “up-zoning,” or increasing allowable uses or developments on land 
near water, because these areas are at risk for flooding.  “Down-zoning,” or reducing the number of allowable uses, 
is more appropriate for at-risk areas in recognition of the city’s police power. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, 
ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 65 (4th ed. 2018). 
89 Debbie M. Chizewer and A. Dan Tarlock, New Challenges For Urban Areas Facing Flood Risks, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1739, 1756 (2013). 
90 Id.  
15 
 
occurs from direct land use regulation enacted to encourage retreat.91   Typical regulations to ward 
off the rising sea level would be a prohibition against residential use, or setting parcel bulk 
restrictions, or possibly prohibiting any further development on the property.92  By declining 
further development or residential use, the city would be exercising its police powers to protect 
public health, safety, and welfare, and change with the needs of the time.93  Zoning regulations are 
generally held valid in recognition of those police powers.94   
Retreat policies may be challenged as a regulatory taking if the zoning regulations impact 
the property so severely that the value of the land diminishes due to an inability to use the land.  In 
such a case, the government will have to answer to a regulatory takings challenge and might have 
to pay just compensation if it is found to be a taking.95  Regulatory takings are not to be confused 
with eminent domain.  The difference is that the government explicitly takes property by eminent 
domain for a specific public purpose.96  In contrast, with regulatory takings, the government is 
regulating land use but does so to the point the owner has lost all beneficial use of the property.97  
A regulation is not a taking if it destroys the utility of one portion of the land, as long as the entire 
land as a whole remains valuable.98     
In a seminal regulatory takings challenge, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a 
landowner paid nearly one million dollars for two residential lots on an island that was 
subsequently regulated by the municipality to ban any permanent habitability structures from being 
built.99  Lucas contended the ban was an unconstitutional regulatory taking, even though the 
 
91 Kaswan, Climate Change Adaptation And Land Use: Exploring The Federal Role, supra note 35, at 516.  
92 Juergensmeyer, supra note 88.  
93 Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 299-300 (1944). 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 See Kelo, 268 Conn. at 35. 
97 See Lucas, 505 US at 1004.  
98 Id.  
99 Id.   
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government did not take the land for its own use, but because it had prevented Lucas from using 
the land in its entirety.100  South Carolina insisted the regulation was put into place to protect the 
land from harmful and noxious uses, which the Court had seemingly always allowed a government 
to do within its police powers.101  South Carolina argued that Lucas’s development would be a 
nuisance in that the construction would contribute to the erosion of the island and further a public 
harm.102 The Supreme Court held that no matter the regulation, if a regulation deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use, the government may resist compensation only if the inquiry into the 
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed uses were not part of the title to begin 
with.103  That is, if the state can prove a valid nuisance ordinance or purpose that existed before 
the regulation prohibiting development, it will likely succeed.104 
The court used examples to describe regulatory takings that would not entitle a landowner 
to just compensation.105  An owner of a lakebed denied a permit to participate in a landfill operation 
would not be entitled to compensation if the effect would flood others’ land.106  The owner of a 
nuclear generating plant would not be entitled to compensation if after the plant was discovered to 
sit on an earthquake fault, he was required to remove all improvements from the land.107  Both of 
these regulations eliminate all economic productive use for the landowners, however, the use of 
these properties for the now prohibited purposes was already always unlawful, the regulations did 
not proscribe a productive use that was previously permissible under existing nuisance 
principles.108 
 
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Lucas, 505 US at 1022 
103 Id. at 1010.   
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1029. 
106 Id.   
107 Id. 
108 Lucas, 505 US at 1029-30. 
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The inquiry into nuisances entails an analysis of the degree of harm to public lands and 
resources; degree of harm to adjacent private properties; the social value of the claimant’s activities 
and their suitability to the locality in question; and the relative ease with which the alleged harm 
can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and government alike.109  The court 
remanded Lucas, and stated that in order for South Carolina to succeed, it must identify 
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses Lucas intended in the 
circumstances in which the property was presently found.110  “Only on this showing can the State 
fairly claim that, in proscribing such beneficial uses, the [land use regulation] is taking nothing.”111 
Lucas may be one of few land-owner-friendly regulation cases.  The question here is if 
regulations were enacted to protect the landowner against harmful or dangerous property, would 
they too be struck down?112  If a regulation prevented a landowner from building not to protect the 
land as a historical site or open space, but to prevent the landowner from any physical or financial 
harm due to impending floods or storms, would that regulation be upheld to protect against an 
 
109 Id. at 1030-32 
110 Id. at 1031. 
111 Id. at 1032.   
112 Additionally, if these regulations did protect the landowner from the dangers of flooding, but did not strip the 
land of all economic value, how would the courts rule?   It is likely the courts would reject these claims brought by a 
landowner.  For example, in Maine, a regulation restricted permits for a limited time to harvest timber on certain 
woodlands for the purpose of protecting wildlife.   A harvesting company brought suit, claiming the regulation 
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violation of due process.   The court rejected these claims.   The harvesting company asserted that the value of the 
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existing nuisance?  Or would it be struck down as in Lucas as stripping the landowner of the value 
of his property?  
Courts have rejected many Fifth Amendment challenges to flood plain ordinances.113  
Courts have only held regulations pertaining to flood plain zoning invalid in a few of the more 
than 125 appellate state and federal cases addressing floodplain regulations over the last decade, 
including those that challenge the regulation as a taking of private property.114  In Beverly Bank v. 
Illinois Department of Transportation, the court held that the Illinois legislature had the authority 
to prohibit the construction of new residences in the 100-year floodway and that a taking claim 
was premature.115  In State of Wisconsin v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment, the court held 
that variance for a replacement of fishing cottage in the floodway of a river was barred by a valid 
zoning ordinance.116  A court rejected a claim that the rezoning of a 150 acre golf course from 
residential to strictly recreational use was a taking because the property was important for flood 
water storage.117  Land use law and flood ordinance jurisprudence suggests that the prevention of 
risky flood plain development, even if partially done for parental reasons, is a valid police power 
objective and would not withstand a takings challenge.118 
As sea level rises, regulatory takings challenges will likely increase as local governments 
strive to find the best solution to protect their citizens.119  However, because the courts have 
routinely held that restricted zoning to protect citizens, or wildlife, or for preservation purposes all 
fall within a city’s police powers, it is likely that restricting coastal living will be deemed lawful 
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and appropriate in order to further a city’s safety scheme.120   Retreat policies, while constitutional 
and focus on keeping the population safe, only exacerbate the effects of climate gentrification.  
People would be forced out of their homes and obliged to find homes on the mainland, rushing 
displacement and not allowing time for any solutions to form.  
As for retreat policies that would take an entire property through eminent domain, the 
Supreme Court has expanded eminent domain powers, by interpreting “public use” broadly, thus 
it is likely these would be constitutional takings.121  The Supreme Court ruled, in Kelo v. City of 
New London,122 that a city could take private property and redistribute it to private developers 
without violating the public use requirement of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.123  The Court 
reasoned that “public use” also meant anything could fall under the purview of “public purpose,” 
that being economic revitalization promoted the government’s interest in economic 
development.124  Local governments have justified flipping the urban demographic using Kelo, for 
example New York City revitalized Harlem and Brooklyn using Kelo’s very principle.125  Kelo 
has led to displacement in these instances where the original residents lost their housing to those 
who would be able to pay more money for the new-and-improved in the same location.126     
Retreating may seem, to coastal residents, as the most unjust form of policy.127  Many 
littoral residents may not want to leave their homes due to strong ties to their communities, 
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children, schools, and personal attachments.  Moving may no longer be a choice as sea levels rise 
and it turns into the only option for safety128, but forcing residents out without planning for an 
adjustment on the mainland only worsens the effects of climate gentrification.   
 
ACCOMMODATION POLICIES 
 Americans believe that people and businesses most at risk from sea level rise should foot 
the bill for recovery efforts and not the general public or government.129  Despite this belief, 
accommodation policies continue to aid those along the coasts.  One of the most problematic 
accommodation policies is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).130  Enacted in 1968 as 
a response to the private insurance market refusing to offer flood insurance, the NFIP aimed to 
insure residents in the zones found on the program’s flood maps, showing which areas were high 
risk or low risk.131  The NFIP is managed through FEMA, and participation in NFIP is not required 
in communities.132  The insurance is only available to those whose communities participate in the 
program by agreeing to enact certain measures to help mitigate flood risk; however, the program 
does not require communities to restrict or forbid building in flood-prone areas.133  Flood-prone 
areas are found on maps drawn by FEMA.134  The maps are not updated regularly, and as sea level 
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rises and flooding occurs more frequently and regularly, the maps cannot keep up with the modern 
change in flood areas or predicted changes in flood-prone zones.135   
  NFIP is heavily subsidized by taxpayers and $25 billion in debt; it has been operating at 
a loss for over a decade.136  Some homeowners take advantage of the program by rebuilding the 
same $100,000 home over nearly two decades of recurring flood damage and superstorm beatings, 
using over a million dollars of the insurance’s resources.137  This ability to repeatedly rebuild 
storm-destroyed homes in the same storm-threatened location is “not only uneconomical and 
inefficient but also could significantly interfere with a local government’s [climate change 
strategy.]”138  Despite the interference, some local governments favor accommodation policies 
because compensating victims and promising for a future change is easier than encouraging people 
to leave.139 
Furthermore, as time continues, rates will rise in order to insure the properties repeatedly 
affected by climate change and the higher the rates rise, the less likely homeowners will choose to 
stay.140  Mortgages on properties not protected by insurance on the coast are deemed unsellable.141  
This in turn reduces the liquidity of the homes and causes higher interest rates on mortgages.142  
Due to the requirement to have flood insurance; the rise in premiums seemingly every year due to 
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Congress’s proposals; and some policies requiring mitigation, like flood proofing, the cost of 
homeownership on the coast becomes nearly impossible to afford, thereby favoring the wealthy.143   
Topical to this discussion would be the wildfires occurring in California in November of 
2018.144  These fires destroyed homes and took lives, however, homes and lives were saved among 
those of the richest population within Malibu and Paradise through private firefighters and access 
to quick getaways.145  While these fires are outside the scope of this article, it is important to note 
that in all aspects of climate change, those who can afford to avoid the risks and protect what’s 
theirs, do, and those who cannot afford to, lose.   
 
HOW CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES INFLUENCE CLIMATE 
GENTRIFICATION 
 Each of the climate change policies discussed above are short term solutions for a long-
term problem.  Protection policies, while a robust solution for landowners along the coast, are 
costly measures borne by the taxpayers.  These policies could aggravate homeowners, like the 
Karans, and force them to flee the area into the unprepared higher elevation.  Furthermore, a 
homeowner may have an extra 20 years added to the life of their property, but eventually the sea 
will engulf their property and they will be forced out.  Protection policies, unaccompanied by a 
land use regulation or other solutions for those already living in the higher elevated areas, will only 
be delaying the inevitable.    
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 Retreat policies exacerbate gentrification and displacement.  Overregulating municipalities 
will either drive their property owners out due to frustration or force them out as soon as possible 
with a prohibition of use ordinance.  These policies will create an influx of property owners fleeing 
to the mainland, possibly inundating a community with a population for which it was not intended 
to provide.     
 Accommodation policies push low-income families out of the coastal properties as rates 
begin to rise and living near water becomes impossible to afford.146  While wealthier families will 
be able to bear the rising costs along the coast, an influx of low-income families will continue to 




Amortization of nonconforming use, an aspect of land use regulation, allows a prior 
existing development with a legal use a set number of years to phase into non-use.147  Amortization 
provisions have a presumption of validity148 and the land owner must ordinarily show that the 
period is too short to be able to recover the money invested in the property were he to challenge 
the ordinance.149 Amortization accompanied by a fair amount of time, is accepted as “obviating 
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the need for just compensation.”150  To justify amortization periods, courts weigh the benefit to 
the public against the loss to the landowner.151 
 Cities should enact amortization periods for coastal properties, determinant on a reasonable 
amount of time, in order to give the property owner enjoyment of their property with notice of why 
they will be retreating within that reasonable amount of time. A reasonable time would be 
determined by the courts152, but in order to satisfy the just compensation principle, a reasonable 
amount of time could be proposed to be 50 years, or about the length of a generation.153  By 
eliminating the coastal zone as a residential zone, the municipalities would be restricting the use 
of property for any reasonable purpose, and could be challenged on the Takings Clause with this 
kind of regulatory taking.154  However, the court has concluded that the elimination of use within 
a reasonable amount of time does not amount to the taking of property, and municipalities would 
likely succeed based on nuisance principles anyway.155  For consideration, the property may very 
well be taken by the sea within a half century anyway.   
 In addition to amortizing zones, cities should consider enacting a transferable development 
rights (TDRs) program in order to prepare higher elevated areas for the eventual population influx.  
TDR programs are typically implemented in historic locations or farm lands, or to protect national 
parks.156  TDRs function by restricting development on a parcel of land that would otherwise have 
 
150 David A. Super, From The Greenhouse To The Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions Control And The Rules Of 
Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1117 (2010) (citing City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 
94, 98 (Ark. 1977) (accepting an amortization provision as an acceptable method of eliminating nonconforming use 
when a city is acting pursuant to its police power)). 
151 Zitter, supra note 141.   
152 See 10 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 53C.08 [E] (2019). 
153 See Id.   
154 Id. (“Amortization has long been a controversial land use regulation technique, as owners of nonconforming uses 
can claim that the removal of a nonconforming use at the end of an amortization period, without compensation, is 
unconstitutional”). 
155 Nicholas R. Williams, Coastal TDRs and Takings in a Changing Climate, 46 URB. LAW. 139 (2014).   
156 Id.  
25 
 
development potential, known as the sending parcel, and allowing properties in the receiving area 
to exceed their zoning density through purchasing the development rights of the sending parcel.157  
TDRs allow the transfer of density from sites that would be identified as having a preservation 
status, and giving those undeveloped rights to allow for density beyond what is already built in the 
receiving area.158   
In 2008, New Jersey enacted its own TDR program, the Highlands Water Protection and 
Planning Act (“Highlands Act”) after the State’s legislature determined the Highlands area, which 
provided drinking water and farmlands to New Jersey, was being lost to development and suburban 
sprawl.159  The Highlands Act serves to protect nearly 800,000 acres from harm by creating two 
areas within the region: a preservation area (sending zone) where development is strictly regulated 
and the development potential can be transferred, and a planning area (receiving zone), in which 
development is encouraged through the purchase of the sent parcels to build at a greater density 
than permitted.160  A landowner who owned 93 acres within the preservation area challenged the 
Highlands Act.161  He claimed the legislation resulted in a taking of his property.162  The court 
disagreed, stating that municipalities within the Highlands area had no obligation to accept the 
designation as receiving zones, and property owners who had obtained TDR credits had no 
assurance of being offered a particular price for them.163  Therefore, the program couldn’t be an 
unconstitutional taking because the Act was a voluntary, market-driven scheme that resulted in 
payment from property developers.164 
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In addition to TDR programs constitutionality, TDR programs are often successful, as illustrated 
in New York City:  
A landowner who constructs a building that uses less than the entire amount of 
development rights available on the site, or whose site is subject to a rezoning that provides 
for additional density beyond what is already built, retains the use of the additional 
development rights. Buildings in New York City that have been designated as historic 
landmarks, such as churches and, famously, Grand Central Terminal, may not be permitted 
to alter the external appearance of their building. The owners of such buildings may, 
however, transfer the unused development potential of their site to adjacent or nearby 
parcels through a certification process.   After the excess development potential has been 
transferred, the landowner retains title to his parcel, as well as the right to use it, provided 
the transferred development rights are not utilized. The owners of Grand Central Terminal 
can continue to operate as a train station once the building's excess development rights are 
sold, and agricultural land under a farmland preservation TDR program may continue to 
be farmed.165 
 
In a coastal context, the beachfront owner would sell their development rights, but still maintain 
their property under the requirement that the use would not involve any construction of new or 
permanent structures.166 
 The best solution to combat displacement on the mainland from coastal expatriates is to 
combine an inclusionary zoning principle with climate change policies, similar to the TDR 
program established above.  Inclusionary zoning itself is constitutional, in fact, required by some 
states.167  Municipalities could require a tax on or percentage of an accommodation policy, like 
flood insurance, to be placed in a trust to assist lower income families who will be inevitably 
affected by the influx of people moving to the mainland.  The same proposition would stand for 
every protection policy – a new dune or seawall – a percentage of the cost to construct would be 
placed in the trust.  Accommodation, protection, and retreat policies each present unique 
challenges – no one of these policies is the perfect solution.  But intertwined with a program that 
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prepares for the challenges the rising sea level will bring, this solution would allow the property 
owner to continue living along the coast without being pushed out by retreat policies and would 
allow for development and inclusive programs within the mainland and urban areas to prevent 
displacement of underrepresented populations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This note put forth the position that sea level rise and municipal legislation could place 
both coastal property owners and the urban population in a difficult situation.  Climate 
gentrification is the process by which those who escape coastal living will gentrify areas inland 
and cause displacement of long-term residents.  This can happen either through property on the 
mainland becoming unaffordable due to its high-elevated resiliency or that maintaining coastal 
property will become too expensive and force out those who cannot afford it into the mainland.   
Any of the common climate change policies that protect the coastal property owners, force them 
to retreat from the coast, or accommodating future living along the coast all only exacerbate 
climate gentrification. 
This note argued that in order to protect the gentrifying areas and not harm the beachfront 
property owners in the process, a Transferable Development Rights program should be instated to 
incentivize development in the urban areas and not take property from the beachfront owners.  This 
note also argued that an amortization period may also be a proper form of retreat for those on the 
coasts as flooding and sea level rise will eventually overtake their property.  These solutions best 
protect property owners without subjecting municipalities to takings challenges.  
 
 
